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Abstract
In this paper we aim at analyzing the impacts on welfare and wealth and consump-
tion distribution across di￿erent labor market structural features. In particular, we
pursue a steady-state analysis to assess the impacts of unit vacancy costs, unemploy-
ment replacement ratio or the job destruction rate, when they are changed in order
to promote a given reduction in the unemployment rate.
We combine a labor market search and matching framework with unions, based
on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with a heterogeneous-agent framework close to
Imrohoroglu (1989) in a closed economy model. Such approach enables the joint
assessment of macroeconomic welfare and inequality together with implications derived
from institutional changes in labor market. Moreover, the transition matrix between
worker’s states is endogenous, fully derived from labor market conditions.
Using feasible calibration to the Euro Area, we conclude that di￿erent institutional
changes to promote unemployment reduction have non-neutral and di￿erentiated ef-
fects on welfare and inequality. While changing unit vacancy costs and job destruc-
tion can be ranked, changes in the unemployment bene￿t replacement ration involve
a trade-o￿ between gains in welfare and in consumption/income distribution.
JEL Classi￿cation: E21, E24, E27, I30, J64.
Keywords: Labor market institutions, search and matching models, heterogeneous-agent
models, welfare and inequality.
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In this paper we aim at analyzing the impacts on welfare and on wealth and consump-
tion/income distribution across di￿erent labor market structural features. In particular, we
pursue a steady-state analysis to assess the impacts of unit vacancy costs, unemployment
replacement ratio or the job destruction rate, when they are changed in order to promote
a given reduction in the unemployment rate.
Heterogeneous agents are embedded in a labor market structure for which they do not
have absolute control. In this context we use a labor market search and matching model,
inspired in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), combined with a heterogeneous-agent model
where worker saving choices are de￿ned as in Imrohoroglu (1989). We complement the
labor market model with an additional source of frictions: the behavior of a Trade Union.
The Trade Union bargains over wages on behalf of the labor force irrespectively of the
idiosyncratic characteristics of each individual. Given the heterogeneity in the decision
for asset holdings, the presence of the Union insures a unique equilibrium wage instead of
multiple wages arising from individual bargaining. This emphasizes the in￿uence of the
institutions over the individual.
Deliberately choosing a parsimonious approach of both frameworks, there is no on-the-
job search, no endogenous job destruction nor any job-search e￿ort. As for the heterogeneous-
agent framework, we consider that utility is driven only by consumption and that no bor-
rowing is allowed. The timing of model-solving consists of two stages. First, ￿rms with
vacancies and unemployed workers interact in search of a match. In parallel, an Em-
ploy‹ers’ Association and a Trade Union set the wage. Both mechanisms de￿ne labor
market conditions. Second, given labor market conditions, optimal behavior of ￿rms and
workers determine, respectively, the demand and supply of capital.
There are only few works that combine these two frameworks. One is Krusell et al.
(2010) who use a search and matching model of the labor market where savings work
as an insurance against unemployment (following the works of Merz (1995); Andolfatto
(1996); den Haan et al. (2000)). Their paper focuses, following the debate in the search
and matching literature that began with Shimer (2005), on the inability of matching mod-
els to replicate the observed volatility on unemployment and vacancy rates. The model
incorporates the worker savings behavior in the wage bargaining and takes the interest rate
as exogenous. The framework closest to ours is that of Nakajima (2010). As in Krusell
et al. (2010), this work also addresses the volatility problematic in the search and match-
ing model by introducing self-insurance. As in our work, an income tax is introduced to
￿nance unemployment insurance but it additionally includes leisure in the utility function
of the worker; interest rate is also endogenous. Shao and Silos (2007) also use a framework
very close to this one. Also with the aim at analyzing the volatility properties of unem-
ployment, vacancies, wages and labor market tightness, interest rate and the transition
matrix are exogenous and borrowing is allowed. In contrast, Bayer and Walde (2010) focus
on the dynamic and equilibrium properties of the matching model with savings. They
1use a con‹tinuous time model where the behavior of risk-averse individuals is analyzed in
steady state equilibrium; they also introduce the dynamics of transition. Interest rate is
exogenous and no comparative statics is performed.
In none of these works the equilibrium is found by allowing the interest rate to be
endogenously determined through the interaction between the optimizing behaviors of
both the ￿rms and the workers. Moreover, the use of a transition probability matrix is,
in our work, truly endogenously determined and derives from the labor market conditions.
Finally, we additionally consider collective bargaining. We leave aside the volatility puzzle
that dominates most of the related literature; instead, we intend to perform steady state
comparative statics across di￿erent unemployment replacement ratios, vacancy unit costs
and the job separation rates, in order to get insights of their implications on welfare and
wealth and consumption/income inequality.
This work is organized as follows: section 2 describes the theoretical model; section 3
describes the computational approach to solve the model in steady state and the compar-
ative statics results; section 4 concludes.
2 Model description
The model combines a search and macthing framework based on Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) with an heterogeneous-agent framework closely following Imrohoroglu (1989). It ap-
plies to a closed economy or to an open economy, large enough to drive international capital
markets; by simpli￿cation, interest rate is endogenously determined only by pressures in
the country’s capital market.
The model considers a mixed system of insurance against unemployment: self-insurance,
through private savings, and an unemployment bene￿t provided by the government. In
the former, the decision is endogenous to the worker; in the latter, a fraction over the net
wage endogenously set by the government and fully ￿nanced by taxes levied on the labor
income of employed workers, such that the government’s budget is always balanced.
No ￿rm-worker bargaining is allowed. Real wages are settled in collective bargaining
between a Employers’ Association (representing ￿rms) and a Trade Union (representing
workers). Since savings as a self-insurance against unemployment derives from individual’s
choices, the Trade Union engages in collective bargaining where the fallback option includes
only the unemployment bene￿t, equally spread across workers.
Perfect competition amongst ￿rms imply that all ￿rms are identical but also that a
free-entry condition holds. All capital used by ￿rms in productive activities are rented
from workers and all savings are available for renting by ￿rms. Thus, savings, capital and
asset holdings refer, in substance, to the same; therefore, we will use these expressions
interchangeably throughout the work.
The model period is one year and the interest rate and wage are referred in real terms
henceforth.
22.1 Firms
There are a large number of ￿rms under perfect competition, owned by all individuals
in equal parts. Each ￿rm holds one job, either occupied by a single worker or vacant.
If occupied, the job-worker pair uses capital to produce a capital-equivalent good with
homogeneous technology described as:
y ≡ y (k) = kα (1)
where k and y represent the per capita stock of capital and output. Additionally, ￿rms
rent capital from workers at interest rate r.
The present value of an occupied job, J ≡ J (y,τ,w,V ), corresponds to the expected
output less rent costs, depreciation of capital, δ, and the gross wage paid to the worker
(upon which a fraction τ is levied as income tax). In addition, there is an instantaneous
probability λ of match separation and, consequently, of losing the value of the occupied
vacancy. On the other hand, the vacant job, V ≡ V (q,J), supports a ￿x cost, c, and has
an instant probability, q, of becoming occupied. Thus, the present values of the occupied
and vacant jobs satis￿es:




rV = −c + qJ (3)
Additionally, in equilibrium, free-entry implies that all pro￿t opportunities for the





Given that q−1 is the average waiting time of the vacant job, the previous expression
states that, in equilibrium, the expected value for the occupied vacancy must equal the
cost of holding a vacant job.
The current asset value from an occupied job, which underlies the formulation of (2),
can be decomposed into the respective income-related components:
Jt = yt − (rt + δ)kt − Ttwt (5)
where the left-hand side of (5) refers to the period’s asset value - or current pro￿t. In the
right-hand side, the ￿rst term represents output, the second term represents capital factor
payments (rent and depreciation) and, ￿nally, the last term represents the labor factor
payment.
3Optimization problem
In this context, the ￿rms choose the amount of capital to use when a job-worker pair
is formed and, the respective labor demand. The problem of the ￿rm is then one of
maximizing the present value of a ￿lled vacancy, J, by choosing the optimum amount of




The solution to the optimization problem (6) is expressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. At the optimum, the ￿rm chooses the amount of capital and labor factor
as to verify:
w ≡ w(y,τ,q) = (1 − τ)













Expression (8) states that the marginal product of capital must cover for the depre-
ciation and the rent of capital. As for expression (7), the optimum wage for the ￿rm,
which follows from the optimum choice of capital, depends positively on output and on
the probability of job matching; negatively on depreciation and rent costs of capital, on
unit vacancy cost (which are direct costs to production) and on the probability of match
separation (which acts as an indirect cost to production). In fact, any increase in direct
or indirect costs of production have negative impacts on wages. The wage expression, w,
is the inverse of the demand for labor function of the ￿rm.
Since ￿rms are homogeneous and own a single vacancy each, the individual demand for
capital corresponds to the average aggregate demand for capital of the whole economy:
Dk = k (9)
2.2 Labor market functioning
Search and matching
As in Pissarides (2000) we consider an economy composed of L workers in the labor force.
A worker can either be employed in a single job or unemployed, therefore, the labor market
is decomposed as L = E + Un. Normalizing to the labor force, 1 = e + u and thus u and
e are the unemployment and employment rates. Similarly, there are N ￿rms in the labor
4market, either occupied by a single employee or vacant, that is, N = E +V c. Normalizing
to the labor force, N
L = e + v and thus v is the vacancy rate. The aggregate labor market
conditions are measured by the relation between the rate of vacancies, v, and the rate of
unemployment, u. For this purpose, v
u = θ represents labor market tightness.
The process through which unemployed and vacancies meet is described by the match-
ing function M = m(v,u). As proposed by Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Pissarides
et al. (1986), the function m(v,u) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, concave,
continuous and increasing in both arguments. In each period an amount M of matches
are produced; of course, we impose that M = min{m(v,u),vacancies,unemployed},
m(0,u) = 0 and m(v,0) = 0. On the vacancy side, ￿rms post job vacancies that are ￿lled







, i.e., the vacancy matching rate. On the unemployment
side, the unemployed worker ￿nds a job at rate p(θ) ≡
m(v,u)
u = m(θ,1), i.e., the unem-
ployment matching rate. More, the dynamics of unemployment exiting and of vacancy
matching follow Poisson processes, that is, the instantaneous endogenous probability of
unemployment exiting and of any vacancy being occupied are, respectively, p(θ) and q (θ).
We also consider a Poisson process for job separation, with an instantaneous separation
rate λ, exogenous. In particular, and following the literature, we assume the Cobb-Douglas
type matching function:
m(v,u) = vηu1−η,η ∈]0,1[ (10)
which implies that
p ≡ p(θ) = θη (11)
q ≡ q (θ) = θη−1 (12)
Notice that, the instantaneous probability of an unemployed worker ￿nding a job, p,
increases when labor market conditions improve, that is, for a given number of vacancies,
a decrease in the number of the unemployed increases the probability of ￿nding a job.
Obviously, the reverse applies for the instantaneous probability of ￿lling a vacant job, q.
At any given moment, a worker can be at one of two states (s): employed (e) or unem-
ployed (d), s = {e,d}. Following Imrohoroglu (1989), labor market ￿ows are determined
by transition probabilities between states de￿ned in the following matrix, Π:







1 − λ λ
p 1 − p
#
(13)
where pji represents the instantaneous probability that a worker is state i becomes a worker
in state j.
5Centralized collective bargaining
In the labor market, workers are represented by a Trade Union and the ￿rms by a Em-
ployers’ Association. The sole purpose of these two institutions is to settle on a wage.
When negotiating, the Trade Union maximizes the rent of the employment state, W ≡
W (w,U), over the fallback option of the unemployment state, U ≡ U (w,p,W):
rW = w − λ[W − U] (14)
rU = bw + p[W − U] (15)
The employed worker receives a wage and faces an instantaneous probability λ of job
separation and, therefore, of losing the surplus of being employed over being unemployed.
If unemployed, the worker receives an unemployment bene￿t and faces an instantaneous
probability p of job matching and, therefore, of gaining a surplus over being unemployed.
On the other side, given all ￿rms are equal, the objective function of the Employers’
Association is identical to that of the individual ￿rm it represents, that is, maximize (2)
over (3).
Optimization problem
We assume that a successful match produces a nonnegative surplus for both the ￿rm
and the worker, that is, both agents are at least better o￿ matched. Being so, let S =
(W − U)+(J − V ) be the total surplus of a successful match in the context of a collective
bargaining. The problem at hand for the Employers’ Association and the Trade Union
is one of agreeing on the wage that maximizes the total surplus of a successful match.







s.t. : S = (W − U) + (J − V ) (17)
where µ ∈ ]0,1[ is the bargaining strength of the Trade Union. The solution to the
maximization problem yields:
µ(J − V ) = (1 − µ)(W − U) (18)
The explicit solution to the collective bargaining problem is expressed in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. The wage that maximizes the total surplus of a successful match is :
6w ≡ e w(y,τ,k,θ) =
(1 − τ)µ
µ + (1 − τ)(1 − µ)(1 − b)
(y − (δ + r)k + cθ) (19)
The wage agreed between the Employers’ Association and the Trade Union decreases
with depreciation and rent cost of capital and increases with output and labor market
tightness. Higher output increases the ￿rm resources to better reward labor; the inverse
occurs when depreciation and capital rent costs increase. Expression (19) is the e￿ective
labor supply.
2.3 Workers
Following Imrohoroglu (1989), we will use the transition probabilities between states of
the worker (13) as a constraint to the maximization of the utility of the worker. From
solving the worker optimization problem we can compute the average aggregate amount of
savings, i.e., the capital supply-side of the model.
A worker maximizes utility taking wage, labor market conditions and interest rate
as given. Being so, let at,ct ≥ 0 be, respectively, the amount of asset holdings and
consumption level in period t, β = (1 + r)
−1 the discount factor and Υ the following
utility function that veri￿es the usual neoclassical properties:





where σ is a risk aversion parameter.
In each period, the worker must decide on the amount of assets to hold in the following
period, at+1, subject to the following budget constraint:
ct ≡ ct (at,at+1,st,πt) = ωt + πt + (1 + r)at − at+1 (21)
where ωt = {wt,bwt} is the current income (for the employed or unemployed state) and πt
is the share of aggregate pro￿ts.1
Optimization problem
The worker must choose a plan {at+1}
∞
t=0 for a given (at,st) as to maximize the discounted











1Firms are owned by workers. The amount of each period’s aggregate pro￿ts are transferred as a lump
sum to workers regardless of state. Since all ￿rms are alike and only the occupied jobs yield positive
returns, the share of the aggregate average pro￿t each worker is entitled to is
JE
L = Je = J (1 − u) ≡ πt.
7The solution to (22) yields the decision rule for next period’s asset holdings, i.e., the
asset supply function that depends on the pair {current employment state , current amount
of asset holdings}:
at+1 = Γ(st,at) (23)
Since we de￿ne a probabilistic framework for the transitions between worker states,
more precisely, a discrete Markov process with a ￿nite number of states with the ergodic
property (13), then an invariant distribution can be determined. Being so, let
ρ ≡ ρ(s) (24)
be the density function for the invariant distribution of asset holdings across workers de-
pending on the worker state. Once determined, it is immediate do calculate the average
aggregate equilibrium asset holding - the capital supply:
Sk ≡ a = Avg {ρ} (25)
2.4 Steady state equilibrium
De￿nition 1. Recursive stationary equilibrium. The recursive stationary equilibrium of
the economy is the set of functions S = {w∗,θ∗,u∗,τ∗,Dk,Sk,r∗} which are the solution
to
1. Optimization problem of the ￿rm: the amount of capital used by the ￿rm maximizes
the value of the occupied vacancy (6), where k is the optimum per capita stock of
capital and w is the inverse of the labor demand function;
2. Collective bargaining optimization problem: the wage agreed between the Employers’
Association and the Trade Union maximizes the match surplus (16), where ˜ w is the
labor supply function;
3. Labor market equilibrium:
(a) the equilibrium wage is such that labor demand equals labor supply:
w∗ = e w(y∗,τ∗,k∗,θ∗) = w(y∗,τ∗,θ∗) (26)
implicit is the labor market tightness index:
θ∗ =

θ : e w(y,τ,k,θ) = w(y,τ,θ),θ ∈ R+	
(27)
8(b) the unemployment rate is constant, i.e. the ￿ows to and out from unemployment
are equal:
(1 − u)λ = up (28)
yielding the endogenous unemployment and vacant rates








4. Government budget equilibrium: unemployment bene￿ts are fully ￿nanced by income
taxes levied over employees:
τ (1 − u)wgross = ubw (31)
yielding the endogenous income tax rate:




5. Optimization problem of the worker: the amount of asset holdings, given wage, inter-
est rate and labor market conditions, maximizes inter-temporal utility of the worker;
and
6. Capital market equilibrium: the equilibrium interest rate of the economy is such that








3 Model implementation and output analysis
3.1 Computational approach2
This model builds on two block linked by an interest rate, the demand and supply blocks.
The demand block determines the asset demand level, which results from the maximizing
behavior of the ￿rm in terms of capital stock used, given wages (and correspondent θ and
u). The labor costs are the result of wage negotiation between ￿rms and the trade union.
From the solution to the wage negotiation and the problem of the ￿rm we get the optimal
capital stock, wages and labor market conditions for di￿erent interest rates. The second
block determines the aggregate savings level, which is supplied by households to ￿rms. The
solution to the worker utility maximization problem, given interest rate, wage and labor
market conditions yields an optimal asset holdings level. The interest rate will make the
2for an extensive description on the computational implementation see da Silva (2010)
9link between the two blocks and will be such that, in equilibrium, the capital demanded by
the ￿rms equals the asset holdings by households and it will be found by trial and error.
In order to solve the model, one has to address each block at a time. First, for a given
r, the demand block is solved by:
1. solving (1) to get the value of the demand for capital, Dk = k;
2. solving (26) together with the previously obtained value for k, and the value for θ is
found;
3. solving (19) together with k and θ: the equilibrium wage (w) is found together with
the unemployment level (u) by using (28); and
4. using (28) into (13) to determine the transition probability matrix, Π.
Once the key values from the demand block are calculated, which are w and Π, we can
solve the supply block, for the same value of r, by:
1. solving the dynamic programming problem (22) through numerical methods to obtain
the decision rule (23), at+1 = Γ(st,at);
2. solving (23) in order to determine the invariant distribution (24), ρ; and
3. using (24) to ￿nd the supply of capital (25), Sk ≡ a = E {ρ}.
At this point, we have determined the value for the demand and supply of capital for a
given r. The interest rate equilibrium value is achieved by guessing across di￿erent values
until convergence, that is, until |Dk (r) − Sk (r)| ≤  veri￿es, with  being an arbitrarily
small positive value.
Welfare and inequality
As we aim at assess the impacts of changing structural features of the labor market,
we compute the steady state value function (22) to measure welfare. Moreover, and to
assess potential inequality impacts of the measures, we complement welfare analysis with
consumption/income dispersion, using the Gini coe￿cient.3
3The technique used for solving the model requires a discrete asset space, therefore, the calculation of
Gini coe￿cient will be:
Gini = 1 −
n X
i=0
(˜ ρi − ˜ ρi−1)(˜ ai + ˜ ai−1)
where ˜ ρ and ˜ a corresponds to the cumulative value for the population and asset holdings at the i
th
quantile, respectively. This index of inequality measures the distance of the variable cumulative distribution
from absolute equality dispersion. It ranges from Gini = 0 (absolute equality) to Gini = 1 (absolute
inequality).
103.2 Calibration
When available we use Euro area data, as collected in Tables 5.3-5.2 in appendix and
in Figure 3.1, which also serve as reference to model’s output. We de￿ne EA(12) as the
Euro area ￿rst 12 member countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
Figure 3.1: Unemployment rate and long term real interest rate (monthly)
For parameter calibration purposes, data show that the average job duration is 11.15
years, hence, λ is calibrated as 0.082.4 Unemployment rate registers an average of 9.17%,
while annualized real interest rate5 has an average of 3.06%. Given that data on the
unit vacancy costs, c, for the EA(12) countries are, to our knowledge, nonexistent, we
chose, residually, the value for c as well as the maximum asset level a worker can hold,
amax, in order to obtain steady state equilibrium interest and unemployment rates as close
as possible to the data. As for the minimum asset level a worker can hold, amin, the
no-borrowing model imposition implies that this parameter is set to zero. 6
Data for the calibration of the production function and matching function are also
incomplete, that is, we could not ￿nd data for a signi￿cant number of countries and the
series wore also small preventing any relevant estimation of the parameters. Given this
we have set these parameters according to the related literature. Of course, in connection
with the production technology, we have also calibrated the depreciation rate of capital
accordingly. For this purpose, we chose the calibration used in Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2007) of the related parameters. As for the utility function, we used the calibration of σ
as in Imrohoroglu (1989), that is, 6.2. Finally, for the unemployment replacement ratio,
b, we rely on Campolmi and Faia (2010), this rate varies between 0.39 for Spain and 0.89
4Given the assumption of a Poisson process for job separation rate, if a job is expected to end once





5Source: ECB. The long term real interest rate is computed as the di￿erence between the 10 year
government bonds interest rate and the HCPI changes relative to the homologous period.
6As in Imrohoroglu (1989), we use a discrete domain for asset holdings possibilities, ie, we divide it
into equally spaced intervals - or points; larger number of points (smaller intervals) imply more accuracy.
This particular technique implies a trade-o￿ between the solution’s accuracy and the computational e￿ort.
Being so, we chose the number of points in the asset holdings domain as to insure the robustness of the
results, that is, we determined the minimum amount of points so that no signi￿cant changes in the outcome
of the model are registered when we reduce the size of the intervals.
11for Ireland. We chose the intermediate value of 0.65. Also, taken the data (see Table 5.2
in appendix) the compensation of employees averages at 48.75% of GDP.
Table 3.1 summarizes the parameter calibration of the model.
Parameter Value Source
α Production function index 0.3333 Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007)
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.0847 Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007)
λ Job separation rate 0.0820 Data on EA(12)
µ Worker bargaining power 0.5000 Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007)
η Matching function index 0.5000 Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007)
σ Utility function index 6.2000 Imrohoroglu (1989)
c Unit vacancy cost 0.4636 Residual
b Wage replacement ratio 0.6500 Campolmi and Faia (2010)
amax Maximum level of asset holdings 4,7531 Residual
amin Minimum level of asset holdings 0.0000 No-borrowing constraint
Table 3.1: Parameter calibration
3.3 Numerical simulations
Steady state results
Figure 3.2 shows the stationary distribution of assets depicting an accumulation point in
Figure 3.2: Employed and unemployed asset holdings distribution (% of the population in
the y axis and the asset holdings level, normalized to k, in the x axis).
the lower end of the asset domain; this is an idiosyncratic result of this type of modeling
[see, for example, Imrohoroglu (1989) (Figure 1, page 1376) or Nakajima (2010) (Figure 1
(e), page 23) for a similar result in a discrete context or Krusell et al. (2010) (Figure 2, page
19) for the continuous time case]. The small dimension of the transition matrix Π and the
choice of utility function, depending on consumption alone, are the reasons, we believe, for
12this behavior. Another consistent feature with similar works is that the employed worker
holds much more assets that the unemployed (Imrohoroglu (1989); Nakajima (2010) and
Krusell et al. (2010)). This is an expected result since, given the homogeneity of the
household behavior, the lower income for the unemployed workers implies a smaller ability
to accumulate wealth.
Variable Data Model
r Interest rate 3.058 3.058 %
u Unemployment rate 9.173 9.173 %
θ Labor market tightness [3.130 , 36.760] 65.907
v Vacancy rate [0.210 , 1.890] 6.046 %
1
p Average unemployment duration 1.396 1.232 periods
Compensation of employees 48.750 64.103 % GDP
Overall Gini coe￿cient [26 , 38] 43.874 %
Table 3.2: EA(12) data vs base case model output
Table 3.2 summarizes the main results of the model in steady state equilibrium com-
pared with the average data collected for the EA(12) countries.
The model is unable to match the vacancy rate and, consequently, the equilibrium labor
market tightness. It is worth mentioning that, on the ￿rm’s side, the optimal behavior
takes into account the vacancy unit cost for which, lacking micro data, we have calibrated
residually. But this calibration strategy may not be the cause of such a high model vacancy
rate result since the value used is within the range used in related literature (see Pissarides
(2009); Krusell et al. (2010) and Bartelsman et al. (2010)). It is our conviction that, once
again, the dimension of the transition matrix Π is the cause of such a high value for the
vacancy rate and, consequently, of the high labor market tightness outcome. Therefore,
increasing the range of states and, perhaps, endogenizing the in-here exogenous λ could
improve the prediction on the vacancy rate.
The share of the labor factor in GDP is higher than observed in 15.35pp. This is due,
as discussed in the previous paragraph, to the abnormal result in the vacancy rate, that
is, we believe the causes of the unbalance between labor and capital weights in output
have the same origins as those from the vacancy rate. See that, one key expression of the
model is the vacancy creation condition (4), which is crucial, not only to the labor market
conditions outcome, but also to output decomposition (5).
The average unemployment duration is lower than data shows: while the model predicts
14.8 months unemployment duration, data shows that it takes 2 months longer for the
unemployed to ￿nd a job.
The Gini coe￿cient for consumption/income is 5.85pp, larger than the high end of the
data interval.
Comparative Statics
The aim of this work is to access how changes in some institutional labor market variables
13b λ c
4 Required change -6.5544 -5.4473 -10.3069 %
4
4%u Required change to percentage change in u ratio 1.2025 0.9994 1.8909
r Interest rate 0.0714 -0.0089 -0.0263 pp
k ≡ a Average per capita asset holdings -0.8714 0.1089 0.3241 %
ae Assets of the employed -0.3056 0.6631 0.9009 %
au Assets of the unemployed -6.4454 -5.3506 -5.3582 %
au/a Unemployed assets to average assets ratio -0.0562 -0.0545 -0.0566 pp
au/ae Unemployed assets to employed assets ratio -0.6252 -0.6064 -0.6297 pp
y Output -0.2913 0.0363 0.1079 %
c Overall Consumption -3.5955 0.8488 0.9318 %
ce Consumption of the employed 0.3231 0.4595 0.5308 %
w Employed current income 0.1647 0.5480 0.6759 %
rae Employed savings income 2.0227 0.3717 0.0332 %
w/ce Current income on consumption -0.1840 0.0174 0.0635 pp
cu Consumption of the unemployed -5.0472 0.4187 0.4216 %
bw Unemployed current income -6.4004 0.5480 0.6759 %
rau Unemployed savings income -4.2605 -5.6246 -6.1721 %
bw/ce Current income on consumption -0.0433 0.1164 0.1290 pp
Υ Overall welfare -0.3577 0.1643 0.1732 %
Υe Welfare of the employed 0.0239 0.0317 0.0356 %
Υu Welfare of the unemployed -0.3536 0.0829 0.0831 %
Ginia Overall Gini for assets 0.1304 0.0934 0.0933 pp
Giniae Employed Gini for assets 0.1113 0.0970 0.0628 pp
Giniau Unemployed Gini for assets 0.1403 0.0590 0.1055 pp
GiniC Overall Gini for consumption -1.0718 -0.1844 -0.1499 pp
GiniCe Employed Gini for consumption 0.0149 0.0118 0.0069 pp
GiniCu Unemployed Gini for consumption 0.0323 0.0109 0.0181 pp
θ Labor market tightness 0.1310 0.0111 0.1310
v Vacancy Rate 0.4191 -0.2660 0.4191 pp
puu Probability of remaining unemployed -5.1528 -0.4499 -5.1528 pp
1
q Vacancy spell 6.3471 0.5541 6.3471 %
1
p Unemployment spell -5.9683 -0.5511 -5.9683 %
τ Income tax rate -0.7066 -0.3463 -0.3463 pp
J Average ￿rm pro￿t 7.0218 -3.5144 -4.8368 %
π Average per capita pro￿t 7.6110 -2.9833 -4.3129 %
Table 3.3: Impacts of changes in labor market institutional variables in order to promote
a 0.5pp reduction in equilibrium unemployment rate
14a￿ect the equilibrium unemployment rate and analyze their implications on welfare and
wealth and consumption/income inequality. In order to make analysis comparable across
institutional changes, we have computed for the required change in the unit vacancy cost,
c, in the unemployment replacement ratio, b, and on the job destruction rate, λ, in order
to accomplish the same reduction (0.5pp) in the unemployment rate; given the baseline
case solution, this comprises to a 5,47% reduction in the unemployment rate. The focus
on these speci￿c institutional variables derives from the fact that: (i) the unemployment
replacement ratio is a direct labor market institutional variable as it captures the amount
of income that an unemployed is entitled to as insurance for becoming unemployed; (ii)
regarding the job separation rate, it captures, though indirectly, job destruction regulation
(job protection legislation, ￿ring costs or age retirement restrictions, for instance, are strong
constraints on the job separation decision); (iii) although the unit vacancy cost is not a
labor market institutional variable, vacancy costs are crucial in the job creation decision of
the ￿rm and, hence, they are meaningfull as they impact strongly on unemployment and
labor market functioning. This variable can be an instrument of labor market intervention,
though, if, for example, apon it incides an employment subsidy to ￿rms or some other form
of intervention that reduces the ￿rm’s cost on job creation.
Accordingly, Table 3.3 presents the required changes in the labor market institutional
features together with the corresponding steady state impacts on the most relevant en-
dogenous variables and also on average welfare and wealth and consumption/income dis-
tribution by worker status.
We start by stating that the desired reduction on the unemployment rate can be
achieved by reasonable changes in all the exogenous variables. It is by itself a positive
outcome since it excludes extreme responses from these variables. For that matter, the
model predicts that in order to decrease the unemployment rate in 0.5pp the replacement
ratio needs to be reduced in 6.55%. Alternatively, the same result is achieved by reducing
5.45% in the job separation rate or by reducing the unit vacancy cost in 10.31%, ceteris
paribus. While the e￿ects are one-to-one of λ in u, it requires 1.2% and 1.9% changes in b
and c to achieve a decrease 1% change in the unemployment rate.
Average per capita capital, k, falls with b and increases with λ and c which, by (1),
pushes the average per capita output, y, in the same direction accompanied by opposite
changes in the equilibrium interest rate. The greatest positive impact is obtained when
we reduce the vacancy unit cost. For the same desired reduction in the unemployment
rate, reducing a direct production cost results in an approximately 3 times greater increase
in output than reducing the job separation rate. Moreover, the reduction in the unem-
ployment replacement ratio achieves the desired reduction in unemployment but yields
negative results on output. In all cases, the unemployed worker owns less assets, au falls,
and, moreover, he owns relatively less than the average employed worker (both au/a and
au/ae ratios decreases).
Average overall welfare decreases only when b is used as a institutional tool towards
unemployment reduction. This results from the large decline in the consumption level of the
15unemployed which is not su￿ciently compensated by the rise in the employed consumption;
hence, average welfare moves directly with b. More precisely, the sharp reduction on the
unemployed consumption is the result of both a fall in current labor-related and savings
income but insu￿cient increase in the ￿rms pro￿ts share: the increase in wage is overcome
by the fall in b and the increase in the interest rate is overcome by a fall in asset holdings,
resulting in a double downward e￿ect not compensated by the great increase in π for the
consumption of the unemployed. In contrast, in the case of λ and c, the fall in savings
income and ￿rms pro￿ts share is more than compensated by the rise in current labor-related
income. As regards consumption of the employed worker, it rises due to the increase in
both current and savings income. Even when the increase in asset holdings is not enough
to overcome the decrease in interest rate, resulting in a marginal reduction on the savings
income (as in case of a downward shock in c), the increase in current labor-related income is
enough to raise the consumption of the employed. Once again, a reduction in c dominates,
yielding the best results in overall (and group-speci￿c) consumption and, consequently, in
overall (and group-related welfare).
Figure 3.3: Impacts on asset holdings distribution of the employed and unemployed due
to changes in labor market institutional variables in order to promote a 0.5pp reduction in
equilibrium unemployment rate. For the employed in the left side and for the employed in
the right side. (% of the population in the y axis and the asset holdings level, normalized
in order of the baseline case average asset holdings for each state, in the x axis)
Figure 3.4: Impacts on the consumption distribution of the employed and unemployed due
to changes in labor market institutional variables in order to promote a 0.5pp reduction in
equilibrium unemployment rate.
16Regarding asset holdings, all inequality indicators worsen, in particular for b. Notice
that, in the case of b for both the employed and unemployed, this is explained by a decrease
in savings, that is, workers savings choices are spread across a much larger domains. Wile
for the case of λ and c we observe that the savings interval norrows and the inequality
increase derives from the fact that workers deviate for the upper and lower boundaries of
the domain.
As for inequality in consumption, all institutional varibles reduce assymetries between
groups but increases for all within group inequality. Given the increase in employed indi-
viduals, who bene￿t from larger consumption levels, a positive e￿ect in overall consumption
inequality is possible in spite of the negative e￿ects in groups-speci￿c inequality. This is the
result of a smaller distence between the distributions of consumption of the employed and
unemployed groups and, at the same time, a wider distribution of individuals throughout
a larger consumption domain within groups, hence, increasing group-speci￿c inequality.
In the case of the reduction in b, the e￿ects are ambiguous because this policy registers
the largest reduction in overall inequality and, at the same time, the larger increases in
groups-speci￿c inequality.
As for labor market tightness, θ improves in all cases, although with a clear smaller
impact in the case of λ due to the opposite e￿ects of a decrease in both unemployment
and vacancy rates (in the case of b and c, a decrease in u is leveraged by an increase in
v). Labor market conditions are determined by the demand and supply for labor which,
from (7), establish a positive relation between λ demand for labor, that is, as jobs last
longer, the average job turnover falls, implying that less job vacancies are available, this
e￿ect dims the positive one resulting from a fall of unemployment in θ. Consequently,
the reduction in the expected duration of unemployment is less sharp and the expected
time for a job vacancy to be ￿lled increases by less in this case when compared with the
alternative structural changes (b and c).
Re￿ecting the improvement in labor market conditions, the wage negotiated between
Employers’ Association and the Trade Union rises for all strategies. The smallest increase
is registered when b is reduced. Given that the opportunity cost of being unemployed (bw)
decreases with b, ceteris paribus, the Trade Union obtains a smaller wage improvement
when negotiating with the Employers’ Association. Apparently, the use of c and λ also
results in higher wages, although for di￿erent reasons: on the one hand, low c corresponds
to low expected job vacancy costs (4) and, therefore, ￿rms are more willing to open new
vacancies, increasing labor demand. This e￿ect is expressed in (7) where the optimum
wage re￿ects the reduction on vacancy costs to compensate for higher wages resulting from
a raise in competition between workers. On the other hand, a low λ corresponds to a low
uncertainty of ￿rms on the asset value of the job; therefore, ￿rms are willing to pay more
to the worker in order to keep the vacancy ￿lled (see also (7)); at the same time a low λ
increases workers fallback option and, consequently, their bargaining power.
As expected, the equilibrium income tax rate decreases in all cases. A reduction in the
number of unemployed requires fewer resources to pay for unemployment assistance and,
17at the same time, there are more employed workers to tax. An additional e￿ect works in
the case of an intervention using b because, obviously, the replacement ratio is reduced,
hence implying an even lower tax rate.
4 Conclusions
In order to access the welfare and redistributive impacts of some institutional changes in the
labor market, we use a labor market search and matching model with aggregate savings
within a heterogeneous-agent framework. We have deliberately elected a simple formu-
lation from the search and matching literature as well as from the heterogeneous-agent
framework. One novelty is the structure of the model which relies in combining labor mar-
ket equilibrium with capital market equilibrium. This speci￿cation allows interest rate to
be determined endogenously. Second, the particular structure chosen for the labor market
interactions, determines an equilibrium that is based on the behaviors of workers and ￿rms
but strongly constrainted by labor market institutions, in particular, the use of a Trade
Union on the wage bargaining process. Third, the model enables to access, besides im-
pacts on structural macroeconomic variables, welfare and wealth and consumption/income
distribution impacts from structural changes in labor market functioning. Fourth, the tran-
sition matrix is endogenous; it is not produced according to exogenous shocks and derives
from the equilibrium outcome.
We conclude that, for a reasonable parameter calibration - mostly based on the EA(12)
economy, the model is accurate in predicting the equilibrium unemployment rate and in-
terest rate. Some deviations are registered in what regards the unemployment duration,
Gini coe￿cient for overall consumption/income and output decomposition. Altough, va-
cancy rate and, consequently, labor market tightness, are higher than data shows. The
results from the comparative statics analysis show that, to obtain a given reduction in the
unemployment rate the reduction in the vacancy unit costs, induces both larger welfare
improvement and a smaller inequality reduction when compared with a strategy relying on
the reduction of the job separation rate. On the contrary, a reduction in the replacement
ratio implies a trade-o￿ between welfare and consumption/income distribution. The fact
that a lower replacement ratio implies a worse welfare may be justi￿ed because the model
ignores the e￿ects that the replacement ratio has on the search intensity of the unemployed.
It is commonly argued that there is a signi￿cant impact of unemployment insurance on the
worker search intensity (see, for instance, Pissarides (2000)) and, therefore, on the proba-
bility of ￿nding a job and thus, on welfare. Therefore, the immediate research agenda for
this future work is the inclusion of search e￿ort by the unemployed worker by allowing the
probability of ￿nding a job be a function of the replacement ratio level and/or by a￿ecting
unemployment duration. Furthermore, the worker utility function in the model should en-
compass a trade-o￿ between consumption and leisure, namely to capture labor supply-side
e￿ects. Another caveat is the small dimension of the transition matrix; the inclusion of
extended characteristics of the worker, such as education level, gender or tenure, would
18certainly produce higher dispersion across households.
Finally, recall that this is a static analysis and, therefore, any results are computed
only by comparing the initial system steady state with the end system steady state. No
transition dynamics is accounted for, thus, we cannot determine if, in fact, the best steady
state results still correspond to the most bene￿cial when including the transition path.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof for Proposition 1
Proposition 1: At the optimum, the ￿rm chooses the amount of capital and labor factor
as to verify:
w ≡ w(y,τ,q) = (1 − τ)












following Pissarides (2000) chap.1, the ￿rm aims at maximizing the asset value of the
occupied vacancy by choosing the optimum amount of capital and labor, therefore, the




in steady state V = 0 and rearranging 2 as J = 1
r+λ (y − (r + δ)k) − wt
(r+λ)(1−τ), the
￿rst order condition is:
dJ (k)
dk
= 0 ⇔ f
0
k = r + δ (35)
20Our choice of production function implies that f0
k = αkα−1, which from the optimizing








In equilibrium all pro￿t opportunities are exhausted, therefore, the vacant job cannot
yield any positive value implying that for (2), with use of (4) and (8), the inverse of the
demand for labor function is:
w = (1 − τ)







5.2 Proof for Proposition 2
Proposition 2: The wage that maximizes the total surplus of a successful match is
w ≡ e w(y,τ,k,θ) =
(1 − τ)µ
µ + (1 − τ)(1 − µ)(1 − b)
(y − (δ + r)k + cθ)
Proof:
Again, following Pissarides (2000) chap.1, in equilibrium, all pro￿t opportunities for
the vacant vacancy are exhausted, therefore V = 0. Rearranging (2) and (14) as J =
1
r+λ (y − (δ + r)k) − w
(r+λ)(1−τ) and W = w+λU
r+λ , respectively, we can substitute in (18):
µJ = (1 − µ)(W − U)
⇔ w =
(1 − τ)
((1 − µ)(1 − τ) + µ)
[(1 − µ)rU + µ(y − (δ + r)k)] (38)





q = θ. Together
with (4) we replace in (18) to achieve at:
µJ = (1 − µ)(W − U) ⇔ µ
c
q






cθ + bw (39)
Finally, using (39) in (38) and making use of (8) yields the desired expression for the wage
as a function of market conditions alone:
w =
(1 − τ)
((1 − µ)(1 − τ) + µ)
[(1 − µ)rU + µ(y − (δ + r)k)]
=
(1 − τ)µ
µ + (1 − τ)(1 − µ)(1 − b)
(y − (δ + r)k + cθ) (40)
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215.3 Tables
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
months 17.54 20.09 20.84 19.98 17.85 16.30 15.42 15.27
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
months 16.75 18.23 18.09 18.28 18.32 17.67 17.42 15.98
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
months 15.61 16.08 15.75 15.68 15.66 14.83 12.39 11.92
Average Source: OECD
16.75
Table 5.1: Average unemployment duration in European countries
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
% GDP 50.1 49.8 49.3 48.8 49.1 49.0
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
% GDP 49.0 49.0 48.9 48.3 48.0 47.6
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010f 2011f 2012f
% GDP 47.3 48.1 49.5 48.9 48.5 48.3
Average f: Forecast. Source: Eurostat
48.75
Table 5.2: Average compensation of employees on EA(12) countries (as a percentage of
GDP)
22Country Gini1 Job tenure3 Vacancy rate4 Unemployment rate5 θ
(years) (%) (%) v/u
Austria 27.00 10.86 0.81 4.26 19.08
Belgium 27.00 11.73 1.10 8.49 12.93
Finland 27.00 10.46 0.76 9.47 8.05
France 28.00 11.31 0.84 9.54 8.79
Germany 30.00 10.63 0.90 8.43 10.68
Greece 32.00 13.44 - - -
Ireland 33.00 10.00 - - -
Italy 35.00 12.17 - - -
Luxembourg 26.00 11.01 0.48 3.03 15.91
Netherlands 27.00 10.05 1.89 5.15 36.76
Portugal 38.00 12.39 0.21 6.53 3.21
Spain 32.00 9.76 0.43 13.70 3.13
Average 11.15 13.17
1 OCDE data on income distribution for the mid 2000’s
3 OCDE yearly data on average job tenure for the 1992-2009 period
4 OCDE yearly data on vacancy rate for the 1981-2009 period
5 OCDE yearly data on unemployment rate for the 1986-2009 period
Table 5.3: Selected data on the EA(12) countries
Variable Value Consumption Value
r Interest rate 3.058 % c Overall 1.917
k ≡ a Capital 4.514 ce Employed 1.132
ae Capital of the employed 4.098 cu Unemployed 0.785
au Capital of the unemployed 0.416
au/a - 9.216 % Utility Value
au/ae - 10.150 % Υ Overall 0.038
w Wage 0.994 Υe Employed 0.083
θ Labor market tightness 0.659 Υu Unemployed -0.045
v Vacancy rate 6.046 %
u Unemployment rate 9.173 % Gini for assets Value
puu Prob. remain unemployed 18.817 % Overall 0.383 %
1
q Vacant vacancy spell 0.812 Employed 0.412 %
1
p Unemployment spell 1.232 Unemployed 0.291 %
τ Income tax rate 6.160 % Gini for consumption Value
Job Decomposition Value % Overall 43.874 %
y Output 1.653 Employed 0.053 %
w
(1−τ) Wage 1.059 (64.10%) Unemployed 0.052 %
rk Capital rent 0.138 (8.35%)
δk Capital depreciation 0.413 (24.98%)
J Job asset value 0.042 (2.56%)
Table 5.4: Baseline case model output
23